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The present study assessed the degree to which probabilistic reasoning performance
and thinking style influenced perception of risk and self-reported levels of
terrorism-related behavior change. A sample of 263 respondents, recruited via
convenience sampling, completed a series of measures comprising probabilistic
reasoning tasks (perception of randomness, base rate, probability, and conjunction
fallacy), the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization
(IPO-RT), the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, and a terrorism-related behavior
change scale. Structural equation modeling examined three progressive models. Firstly,
the Independence Model assumed that probabilistic reasoning, perception of risk and
reality testing independently predicted terrorism-related behavior change. Secondly, the
Mediation Model supposed that probabilistic reasoning and reality testing correlated,
and indirectly predicted terrorism-related behavior change through perception of
risk. Lastly, the Dual-Influence Model proposed that probabilistic reasoning indirectly
predicted terrorism-related behavior change via perception of risk, independent of
reality testing. Results indicated that performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks
most strongly predicted perception of risk, and preference for an intuitive thinking
style (measured by the IPO-RT) best explained terrorism-related behavior change. The
combination of perception of risk with probabilistic reasoning ability in the Dual-Influence
Model enhanced the predictive power of the analytical-rational route, with conjunction
fallacy having a significant indirect effect on terrorism-related behavior change via
perception of risk. The Dual-Influence Model possessed superior fit and reported
similar predictive relations between intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational routes
and terrorism-related behavior change. The discussion critically examines these findings
in relation to dual-processing frameworks. This includes considering the limitations
of current operationalisations and recommendations for future research that align
outcomes and subsequent work more closely to specific dual-process models.
Keywords: perception of risk, probabilistic reasoning, reality testing, terrorism-related behavior change, thinking
style
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INTRODUCTION
Acts of terrorism result in tens of thousands of deaths annually
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016) and negatively affect
people worldwide (Hobfoll et al., 2007). Consequently, mass
media outlets prominently feature news of terrorist attacks,
threats and risks (domestic and international). This coverage
reflects the fact that terrorist incidents/activity are a major cause
of concern within contemporary societies (Goodwin et al., 2005).
Indeed, perceived risk of terrorist attack is so pervasive that it
can instigate behavior change, including lifestyle choices (Torabi
and Seo, 2004), transportation preference, (Blalock et al., 2009),
travel intentions, (Reisinger and Mavondo, 2005) and selection
of tourist destinations (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998). Relatedly,
previous research indicates that perceived risk has a moderate
positive direct and indirect (mediating) effect on behavior
change in response to perceived terrorist threat (Goodwin et al.,
2005). Specifically, Goodwin et al. (2005) established that greater
perceived risk informed a reduction in planned air travel,
use of public transport, and changes to daily routine, with
risk additionally determining behavior change in response to
individual differences (age, gender, personality).
At a societal and individual level, terrorist activity reinforces
anxieties, heightens awareness of potential risk and increases the
likelihood of further behavior change (Finseraas and Listhaug,
2013). Behavior change ensues when appraisal of risk (likelihood
and severity) exceeds perceived ability to cope (Rogers, 1983,
1985). Once this occurs, protection motivation (the desire
to perform protective activities) is aroused and behavioral
intentions and attitudes alter (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Qi et al., 2009).
In this context, perception of risk has potentially profound effects
on individual and collective actions.
The current paper contends that thinking style is an important
factor likely to influence perception of risk and terrorism-
related behavior change. Thinking style embodies trait-like
differences in information processing related to two extensively
researched modes of thinking, objective-rational vs. subjective-
intuitive (Kozhevnikov, 2007). The former employs logic and
appreciation of probability to guide decision and opinion
outcomes, whilst the latter bases decision making on intuition
and affective appraisal of situations/events, and is experiential
(Epstein, 2003). Acknowledging this crucial distinction, the
present paper operationalised objective-rational thinking style in
terms of probabilistic reasoning ability and subjective-intuitive
thinking style in relation to proneness to reality testing deficits.
The degree to which these ‘thinking styles’ influenced perception
of risk and terrorism-related behavior change was then assessed.
A delineation of these concepts follows discussion of the
characteristics of risk perception.
Risk Perception
Risk is a psychological concept based on individual perception
rather than empirical fact (Slovic and Weber, 2015). Threat-
related inference derives from personal evaluation of qualitative
characteristics related to a situation/stimulus, rather than
objective ‘hazard’ features (Slovic, 1987). Personal judgment
determines which information defines danger even in
circumstances where level of risk is evident and associated
probabilities known (Jenkin, 2006).
Misperception of risk is important because it is likely to
produce ineffective or even detrimental behavior adaptation.
Illustratively, the 9/11 terrorist attacks facilitated migration from
flying to driving (Blalock et al., 2009). A behavioral change that
paradoxically increased driving associated deaths (estimated at
2170). This mismatch between risk (actual vs. perceived) and
behavior change could arise for several reasons. For instance,
misappreciation of hazard likelihood or bounded rationality,
where factors other than estimation of probability determine
decision-making (cf. Gray and Ropeik, 2002; Kahneman, 2003;
Cokely and Kelley, 2009).
Factors Influencing Risk Perception
This study assessed the extent to which variables, previously
identified as important in guiding judgments under uncertainly,
influenced decision making related to potential threat. The
first factor was probabilistic reasoning ability. This was
conceptualized in terms of a thinking style involving rational
appraisal of probabilistic outcomes (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994;
Epstein et al., 1999). The general defining feature of this rational
approach is a focus on objective evaluation of environmental
features.
Consequently, the rational thinking style is measurable via
probabilistic reasoning tasks. Performance provides an indication
of the degree to which individuals make accurate use of statistical
information in decision-making situations. This approach is
germane to the study of risk perception (c.f. Slovic and
Weber, 2015) and is rooted in the decision-making tradition
of Kahneman and Tversky (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky,
1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). In tandem, probabilistic
measures assessed the extent to which thinking style informed
perception of risk (Schwenk, 1984) and self-reported terrorism-
related behavior change. Concomitant research in the domain
of unconventional beliefs has revealed that ‘apparently’ related
anomalous beliefs (paranormal, conspiracies and urban legends)
are associated with important cognitive-perceptual processing
differences (Dagnall et al., 2016a,b).
The second factor, related to outcome judgment was
subjective evaluation. This derives largely from self-generated
cognitions, perceptions and interpretations, such as intuition
and personal experience. The present study used the reality
testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization
(IPO-RT) (Lenzenweger et al., 2001) to index this thinking style.
The IPO-RT assesses the inclination to intuitive-experiential
(vs. analytical-rational) processing. Specifically, “the capacity
to differentiate self from non-self, intra psychic from external
stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria of
reality” (Kernberg, 1996, p. 120). Principally, the IPO-RT assesses
subjective propensity to reality testing errors via the ability to
distinguish between internal and external sources. Accordingly,
the researchers reasoned that suspension of reality testing, or
proneness to reality testing deficits reflected a preference for an
intuitive-experiential information processing style (Irwin, 2004).
From a broader perspective, these variables can be
conceptualized as risk perception deriving from an objective
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1721
fpsyg-08-01721 October 11, 2017 Time: 14:31 # 3
Denovan et al. Perception of Risk and Terrorism-Related Behavior Change
analysis of the situation ‘risk as analyses,’ and from a more
intuitive feeling based assessment ‘risk as feelings’ (Slovic
and Peters, 2006). The former, refers to judgment of risk
arising using scientific deliberation, logic and reason. From
this perspective, perception of danger arises as a function of
the systematic appraisal of threat-related information, and the
utilization of cognitive strategies and algorithmic rules that
allow for an effective combination of decision elements into an
overall judgment. This deliberate analytical process influences
behavior change through appraisal-based elements, including the
weighing up of potential risk (Epstein et al., 1996). Contrastingly,
risk as feelings draws upon intuitive reactions that are the
outcome of fast associative processing based on experience. This
process is guided by heuristics and biased by affective signals
(Slovic et al., 2004), self-efficacy (Stevens et al., 2012) and shared
normative perceptions (Goodwin et al., 2005). A predominant
characteristic of risk as feelings is the influence of affective signals
and the motivated behavior that results in order to prolong or
avoid experiences.
The Current Study
Previous work suggests that, although positively correlated,
general perception of risk and terrorism-related behavior
originate from different thought processes. Specifically, cognitive
evaluations (risk as analyses) influence perception of risk, whilst
affect (risk as feelings) promotes terrorism-related behavior
change. Indeed, a significant body of knowledge designates that
incorrect perception of risk stems from faulty estimation of
real world danger. For example, risk related to dramatic or
sensational causes of death (e.g., accidents, homicides, cancer and
natural disasters) is often overestimated and risk associated with
conventional/mundane sources (e.g., common illness) under-
estimated (Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic, 2016). These findings
suggest a strong relationship between perception of risk and
probabilistic reasoning performance. Contrastingly, terrorism-
related behavior change because of its affective element should
relate more strongly to an intuitive thinking style. This view
accords with theoretical conceptualizations of terrorism, which
depict terrorism as acts and actions intended to impart fear and
create feelings of vulnerability and insecurity (Gross et al., 2016).
In addition, previous research indicates that perception of risk
has a direct and indirect effect on terrorism-related behavior
change (Goodwin et al., 2005); this should occur specifically in
relation to probabilistic reasoning (Epstein et al., 1996).
The present study used structural equation modeling (SEM) to
examine the dual-influence of probabilistic reasoning (rational)
vs. reality testing (intuitive) in relation to risk perception and
terrorism-related behavior change. Three different theoretically
driven models were tested (Figure 1). The first, Independence
Model, was parsimonious and conceptually simple. It assumed
that no relationships existed between probabilistic reasoning, risk
perception and reality testing, and that each of these constructs
independently predicted terrorism-related behavior change. The
second, Mediation Model, supposed that probabilistic reasoning
and reality testing correlated, and had an indirect (mediated)
effect on behavior change through risk perception. The third,
Dual-Influence Model, proposed that probabilistic reasoning
(analytical-rational processing), indirectly predicted terrorism-
related behavior change via perception of risk, independent
of reality testing (intuitive-experiential processing). Collectively,
these models represented the most plausible theoretical solutions.
The method of comparing theoretically acceptable models
facilitates better comprehension of inter-relationships among
factors. This approach has proved highly successful within other
areas of psychology (see Hubbard and Mannell, 2001).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A sample of 263 participants (139 women, 53% and 124
men, 47%) took part in this study. The mean age was 32.50
(SD = 14.16), and the age range was 18–87 years. The mean
age for men was 31.38 (SD = 13.38; range= 18–77 years),
and the mean age for women was 33.50 (SD = 14.56;
range = 18–87 years). Respondents included undergraduates,
postgraduates and employees from Manchester Metropolitan
University (MMU) together with members of the wider
community. Recruitment was via social media, university staff
email, and through local stakeholders (businesses, and vocational
classes). Involvement was voluntary and responses anonymised.
Participants could withdraw up to 4 weeks after data collection.
Exclusion criteria required that respondents were at least 18 years
of age, had not previously studied heuristic bias and had not taken
part in previous probabilistic reasoning research.
Materials
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale
(DOSPERT)
The revised DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002; Blais and Weber,
2006) assessed general perception of risk. The measure contains
30-items assessing behavioral intentions, the degree to which
respondents believe they are likely to engage in risky behaviors.
Items appear as statements and relate to five domains of life
(ethical, financial, health/safety, social and recreational risks).
For example, ‘piloting a small plane.’ Respondents indicate their
perceived level of risk for each situation on a 7-point scale;
1= not at all risky to 7= extremely risky. Total scores range from
30 to 210, with upper scores indicating higher levels of perceived
risk. The DOSPERT has been widely used within research and is
a validated scale, possessing established psychometric properties.
The original 40-item DOSPERT scale demonstrated satisfactory
internal consistency, adequate test–retest reliability and validity
(Weber et al., 2002), and in this study the DOSPERT was
internally consistent (α= 0.85).
Behavior Change
Behavior change items developed by Sinclair and LoCicero
(2006) assessed the degree to which respondents perceived their
behavior had changed because of previous terrorist activity.
Items originated from open-ended statements presented to
focus groups (Sinclair and LoCicero, 2006). Questions asked
participants about behavior change since 9/11. Emergent items
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FIGURE 1 | Competing models of the potential relationships among probabilistic reasoning, reality testing, risk perception, and terrorism-related behavior change.
related to common aspects of everyday life (fear of flying,
avoiding cities, public transportation, etc.). In the present study,
statements were adapted for use with a UK sample. For instance,
‘trams’ replaced ‘subways’ and ‘shopping centers’ replaced ‘malls.’
To avoid offense to potential participants the researchers omitted
a statement referring to interacting with Middle Eastern or
people of Arab descent. Thus, the modified behavior change
measure comprised eight-items. Responses were recorded on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 (I do it about the same) to 5 (I do
not do it anymore); total scores ranged from 8 to 40. Higher
scores indicated increased levels of terrorism-related behavior
change. Previous work found the original behavior change items
functioned as a single construct possessing good psychometric
properties (internal reliability, face validity and conceptual
similarity) (Sinclair and LoCicero, 2006). In this study, the
terrorism-related behavior change measure demonstrated good
internal reliability (α= 0.73).
Reality Testing Inventory of Personality Organization
The reality testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality
Organization (IPO-RT) (Lenzenweger et al., 2001) assessed
preference for intuitive (vs. rational) thinking. The IPO-RT
is a unidimensional self-report measure, which measures ‘the
capacity to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from
external stimuli and to maintain empathy with ordinary social
criteria of reality’ (Kernberg, 1996, p. 120). Accordingly, the
IPO-RT focuses on information processing style rather than
psychotic symptomology (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000; Irwin,
2004). The IPO-RT comprises 20 statements (e.g., ‘I feel that
my wishes or thoughts will come true as if by magic’).
Participants respond via a five-point Likert scale (1 = never
true to 5 = always true). Total scores range from 20 to 100,
with low scores indicating high reality testing (preference for
analytical-rational thinking). Several recent studies have used
the IPO-RT because it possesses good psychometric properties.
Lenzenweger et al. (2001) report the scale is internally consistent
and temporally stable with non-clinical populations. Indeed,
the IPO-RT demonstrates retest reliability (r = 0.73) and
good construct validity (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The IPO-RT
possessed excellent internal reliability in this study (α= 0.91).
Probabilistic Reasoning Tasks
Twenty tasks assessed appreciation of probabilistic reasoning.
These problems have featured in several previous studies
(Dagnall et al., 2007, 2014). Tasks were organized into four
sections comprising one of each probabilistic reasoning
type (perception of randomness, base rate, probability and
conjunction). Responses required that participants selected one
answer (the most likely outcome) from a range of alternatives.
Tasks function as independent measures of probabilistic
reasoning performance (scored 0–5) and provide an overall
measure of probabilistic reasoning ability (scored 0–20). In
all instances, higher scores indicate greater appreciation of
probabilistic reasoning. The tasks included were:
Perception of randomness
This required participants to judge the likelihood of obtaining
various strings/sequences (e.g., ‘when tossing a coin six times,
which pattern of results do you think is most likely? (a)
HHHHHH, (b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely’).
Base rate
Participants evaluated the outcome of probability based on
presented base rate evidence (e.g., ‘you go to a party where there
are 100 men, 70 of the men are psychologists and 30 are engineers.
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Prior to meeting a man, the host provides a short personality
description: Jack is a 45-year old man. He is married with four
children. He is generally conservative, careful and ambitious. He
shows no interest in politics or social issues and spends much
of his free time on his hobbies, which include carpentry, sailing
and mathematical puzzles. What is the probability that Jack is an
engineer? (a) 100%, (b) 70%, (c) 50%, (d) 30%’).
Probability
Participants selected the correct likelihood of success from
alternative scenarios (e.g., ‘Melissa shuﬄed a deck of number
cards containing five each of the numbers two, four, six, and
seven. If Melissa randomly selects a four from the deck and does
not return it, what is the probability that she will select a four
on her next draw? (a) 3/20 [0.15], (b) 4/5 [0.80], (c) 4/19 [0.21],
(d) 1/4 [0.25]’).
Conjunction fallacy
From a range of events, participants specified the most
likely outcome. Statements were presented either as single or
co-occurring events (e.g., ‘two football teams [Team A and
Team B] are playing in a local derby. What is the most likely
outcome of the game?’ (a) Team A score first and the game is
drawn, (b) Team A score first and win, (c) Team A score first and
lose, (d) Team A scores first’). Within conjunction problems, the
likelihood of event intersection could not exceed the probability
of single constituent events (c.f., Tversky and Kahneman, 1982,
1983).
Procedure
Prior to involvement, potential participants read the background
information. This stated that the research was concerned with
cognitive-perceptual personality factors related to perceptions of
risk and terrorism. Only participants consenting to take part
received the materials booklet. Instructions within the booklet
asked participants to take their time and to answer questions
openly and honestly. The booklet comprised five subsections:
demographic information (completed first), reality testing, risk
perception, terrorism-related behavior change and probabilistic
reasoning tasks. To avoid order effects, section sequence rotated
across respondents.
Ethics Statement
The researchers obtained ethical approval for the study as
part of a research proposal examining relationships between
anomalous beliefs and cognitive-perceptual measures (‘Statistical
Bias, Context and Anomalous Beliefs: A Critical Evaluation’).
The Director of the Research Institute for Health and Social
Change located within the Faculty of Health, Psychology and
Social Care within MMU approved the project (methodological
and ethical); 01/08/2017. This is the necessary level of ethical
clearance for projects rated as ‘routine.’ It is a university
condition that all proposals are peer-reviewed by members of the
Professoriate (or equivalent) prior to submission. This includes
ethical scrutiny and gaining clearance in principle. Additionally,
the Head of the Psychology Department must sanction research
projects. Respondents indicated informed consent by ticking a
box prior to participation; no personal information was collected
other than age, preferred gender and general location. This
procedure ensured that respondents had read and understood
the instructions. Formal submission to a university ethics panel
beyond this process is not an institutional requirement for
routine studies.
Analytical Strategy
Analysis involved two related phases. The first examined variable
means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations (see
Tables 1–3). The second phase employed structural equation
modeling (SEM) using AMOS 23 to examine the fit of three
competing models. Model 1 (Independence Model) assumed
that probabilistic reasoning, risk perception and reality testing
independently predicted terrorism-related behavior change.
Model 2 (Mediation Model) presumed that probabilistic
reasoning and reality testing had an indirect (mediated) effect
on terrorism-related behavior change through risk perception.
Within SEM, mediation analysis examines whether specific
variables act as an intermediary between other variables.
In the present study, this was risk perception. Mediation
analysis within psychology is important because it reveals
mechanisms underlying the relationships between variables.
Model 3 (Dual-Influence Model) anticipated that reality testing
predicted terrorism-related behavior change independent of
the probabilistic reasoning-risk perception route, and that
probabilistic reasoning had an indirect effect through risk
perception on terrorism-related behavior change.
Several fit indices assessed relative model fit. These comprised
measures of absolute and incremental fit. Absolute indices
(i.e., Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, SRMR and Root-
Mean-Square Error of Approximation, RMSEA) determine how
well a priori models fit the sample data and indicate which
proposed model possesses superior fit (Hooper et al., 2008).
Incremental indices (i.e., the Comparative Fit Index, CFI and the
Incremental Fit Index, IFI) compare observed chi-square values
with baseline models and assume that all latent variables are
uncorrelated (null model) (Hooper et al., 2008).
An acceptable model requires SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA < 0.08,
CFI > 0.90 and IFI > 0.90 (Brown and Cudeck, 1993). Marginal
fit is indicated by SRMR and RMSEA values of 0.08–0.10 and
CFI and IFI values of 0.86–0.90 (Nigg et al., 2009). RMSEA used
the 90% confidence interval. Bootstrapping estimates (resampled
5000 times using the bias-corrected percentile method to create
95% confidence intervals) examined indirect effects for the
Mediation and Dual-Process Models. The Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI),
both measures of quality of statistical models, compared
non-nested models. Lower values indicated superior fit.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Assumptions were initially checked (outliers, multicollinearity,
linearity), and eight participants were removed due to possessing
z-scores greater than 3.29 or less than −3.29 (Tabachnick and
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Fidell, 2007) leaving a final sample of 255. Following data
screening, means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations
for scales were calculated. Perception of risk positively correlated
with terrorism-related behavior change, r(253)= 0.26, p < 0.001,
and terrorism-related behavior change positively correlated with
reality testing, r(253) = 0.27, p < 0.001. In addition, ethical,
recreational, financial, and health/safety risk factors positively
correlated with terrorism-related behavior change (see Table 1).
There was no significant association between perception of risk
and reality testing, r(253)= 0.11, p= 0.095.
Descriptive statistics for probabilistic reasoning tasks together
with intercorrelations appear in Table 2. Probabilistic reasoning
tasks correlated positively, relationships were in the moderate
range (ranged from r = 0.21 to r = 0.36).
Correlations between probabilistic reasoning tasks, reality
testing, risk and behavior change appear in Table 3. Results
indicated that terrorism-related behavior change was significantly
negatively associated with all indicators of probabilistic reasoning
(perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy, base rate and
probability). Risk perception significantly negatively correlated
with all probabilistic reasoning types, except perception of
randomness. Reality testing only weakly correlated with
probability. Observing that perception of randomness was
weakly associated with risk-related factors, subsequent analysis
excluded perception of randomness (perception of randomness
failed to correlate with risk perception and was only weakly
associated with terrorism-related behavior change).
Measurement Model
The first step in model evaluation was to examine the
measurement model. This depicted latent variables as covarying
(probabilistic reasoning, reality testing, risk perception and
behavior change). In order to increase degrees of freedom
and the statistical power of the tested models (Coffman
and MacCallum, 2005), item parceling within latent variables
occurred. Additionally, item parcels are more likely to be
normally distributed, and to meet the assumptions of the
maximum likelihood method typically used in confirmatory
factor analysis and SEM (Thompson and Melancon, 1996).
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using oblique (promax)
rotation assessed items on each latent variable. The observed
factor loadings informed item to parcel allocation, with
apportionment corresponding to descending order (Coffman and
MacCallum, 2005).
EFA reported that each indicator of probabilistic reasoning
possessed a single factor structure. In order to include
these factors as latent variables, variance was determined by
multiplying scale variance with alpha reliability (Kline, 2011).
EFA revealed reality testing comprised four factors and terrorism-
related behavior change comprised two factors. Both of these
measures were subjected to EFA because inconsistency exists
regarding the definitive factor structure for the reality testing
subscale of the IPO-RT (Ellison and Levy, 2012), and because
the behavior change measure was adapted for use within the
current study. Byrne (2013) advocates EFA when no strong
conceptual underpinning is present. The four-factor solution for
reality testing (IPO-RT) accounted for 56.2% of variance (all
loadings > 0.4 apart from items 17 and 4). Factor 1 (items 2, 5,
7, 8, 9, 16, 17) was labeled ‘auditory and visual hallucinations’;
factor 2 (items 12, 14, 15, 18, 19) was labeled ‘delusional thinking’;
factor 3 (items 4, 10, 13, 20) was labeled ‘social deficits’; factor
4 (items 1, 3, 6, 11) was labeled ‘confusion.’ Identification of
factors was consistent with theoretical underpinnings of reality
testing deficits and previous factor analyses of the reality testing
subscale of the IPO-RT (Bell et al., 1985; Caligor and Clarkin,
2010; Dagnall et al., 2017). The two-factor solution for terrorism-
related behavior change accounted for 55.3% of variance, with
all variables (apart from item 4) loading > 0.4. The factors
were labeled as ‘changes to travel habits’ (items 2, 1, 3), and
‘changes to personal preferences’ (items 6, 7, 5, 8, 4). Existing
subscales (ethical, financial, health/safety, social and recreational
risks) determined the risk perception latent variable. Established
research supports the hierarchical factor structure of this measure
(Blais and Weber, 2006). The measurement model demonstrated
acceptable fit, χ2(65, N = 255) = 109.38, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.95,
TLI= 0.92, SRMR= 0.05, RMSEA= 0.05 (CI of 0.03–0.06), and
all factor loadings were significant (p < 0.001).
Structural Models
The Independence Model (Supplementary Figure 1)
demonstrated acceptable data-model fit on all criteria, but
SRMR, χ2(72, N = 255) = 147.64, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.91,
IFI = 0.91, SRMR = 0.09, RMSEA = 0.06 (CI of 0.04–0.07).
SRMR revealed marginal fit. Structural paths indicated that
TABLE 1 | Descriptive information and intercorrelations among reality testing, terrorism-related behavior change, risk perception, and risk perception subscales.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1) Reality testing 35.77 11.18
(2) Behavior change 12.05 4.15 0.27∗∗
(3) Perception of risk total 130.44 20.97 0.11 0.26∗∗
(4) Ethical risk 28.53 5.95 0.03 0.20∗∗ 0.78∗∗
(5) Financial risk 28.49 5.90 0.06 0.14∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(6) Health/Safety risk 30.54 5.92 −0.01 0.20∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(7) Recreational risk 25.20 6.45 0.09 0.25∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(8) Social risk 17.67 4.97 0.24∗∗ 0.11 0.53∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.34∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive information and intercorrelations among probabilistic reasoning tasks.
M SD Proportion 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Perception of randomness 3.90 1.06 77.19
(2) Base rate 1.74 0.96 34.68 0.24∗∗
(3) Conjunction fallacy 2.17 1.40 43.65 0.36∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(4) Probability 2.39 1.04 47.30 0.24∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(5) Overall problem total 10.21 3.03 50.70 0.67∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.63∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
probabilistic reasoning did not have a significant negative effect
on terrorism-related behavior change. However, it is important
to note that direct effects are not a necessary condition to test for
mediation in the Mediation and Dual-Influence Models. Instead,
emphasis should be on testing the magnitude of indirect effects
(for a discussion see Rucker et al., 2011). Risk perception had a
significant positive effect on terrorism-related behavior change
(β = 0.31, p = 0.022), as did reality testing (β = 0.34, p < 0.001).
Overall, the Independence Model accounted for 29% of the
variance in behavior change.
The Mediation Model (Supplementary Figure 2) possessed
acceptable fit on all indices, χ2(69, N = 255)= 128.80, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.93, IFI = 0.93, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of
0.04–0.07). The structural paths indicated that of the probabilistic
reasoning types, conjunction fallacy had a significant negative
effect on risk perception (β = −0.41, p = 0.030). Reality
testing did not have a significant effect on risk perception
(β= 0.04, p= 0.630) and possessed a non-significant correlation
with all indicators of probabilistic reasoning. Risk perception,
meanwhile, had a significant positive effect on terrorism-related
behavior change (β = 0.40, p < 0.001). Bootstrapping estimates
indicated that conjunction fallacy had an indirect effect on
terrorism-related behavior change through risk perception that
was significant at the 95% confidence level across bias-corrected
percentile point estimates (p = 0.021, 95% Cl = −0.41 to
−0.03). Specifically, the standardized indirect effect was −0.16,
suggesting that behavior change decreases by 0.16 standard
deviations for every unit increase in conjunction fallacy indirectly
through risk perception. The model accounted for 26% of the
variance in risk perception and 16% of the variance in terrorism-
related behavior change.
The Dual-Influence Model (Figure 2) demonstrated
acceptable fit on all indices, χ2(72, N = 255) = 117.89,
TABLE 3 | Zero-order correlations between probabilistic reasoning tasks, reality
testing, risk perception and terrorism-related behavior change.
Risk
perception
Behavior
change
Reality
testing
Perception of randomness −0.08 −0.13∗ −0.09
Base rate −0.30∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.06
Conjunction fallacy −0.27∗∗ −0.18∗ −0.05
Probability −0.17∗ −0.19∗ −0.10
Overall problem total −0.31∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.11
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
p= 0.001, CFI= 0.94, IFI= 0.95, SRMR= 0.06, RMSEA= 0.05
(CI of 0.03–0.06). Consistent with the Mediation Model,
conjunction fallacy had a significant negative effect on risk
perception (β = −0.41, p = 0.030), and risk perception had a
significant positive effect on terrorism-related behavior change
(β= 0.39, p < 0.001). In addition, reality testing had a significant
positive effect on terrorism-related behavior change (β = 0.34,
p < 0.001). Bootstrapping estimates indicated that conjunction
fallacy had a significant indirect effect on terrorism-related
behavior change through risk perception across bias-corrected
percentile point estimates (p= 0.014, 95% Cl=−0.41 to−0.03).
The standardized indirect effect was −0.16, and the model
explained 25% of the variance in risk perception and 27% of the
variance in behavior change. A comparison of AIC and ECVI
values revealed that the Dual-Influence Model (AIC = 211.89;
ECVI= 0.83) provided a superior data fit than the Independence
Model (AIC = 241.64; ECVI = 0.95) and the Mediation Model
(AIC= 228.80; ECVI= 0.90).
Overall, conjunction fallacy had a significant indirect effect
on terrorism-related behavior change via risk perception. These
findings specified an analytical-rational route to behavior change.
Results also indicated that reality testing does not directly predict
risk perception, but independently predicts behavior change
supporting an intuitive-experiential route to terrorism-related
change behavior as a function of perceived threat.
DISCUSSION
Consideration of the Current Findings
As hypothesized, scores on probabilistic reasoning tasks most
strongly predicted perception of risk, and preference for an
intuitive thinking style (as indexed by IPO-RT) best explained
terrorism-related behavior change. The combination of risk with
indicators of probabilistic reasoning in the Dual-Influence Model
enhanced the predictive power of the rational-analytical route.
Consequently, the Dual-Influence Model found similar predictive
relations between the intuitive and analytical thinking styles.
With regard to perception of risk, lower performance on
probabilistic reasoning tasks was moderately associated with
higher levels of risk perception and weakly correlated with
increased terrorism-related behavior change. Contrastingly, the
association between reality testing and terrorism-related behavior
change was in the weak to moderate range. Additionally, there
was no meaningful correlation between reality testing and risk
perception.
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FIGURE 2 | Dual-Influence Model. AVH, auditory and visual hallucinations; DT, delusional thinking; SD, social deficits; CON, confusion. Latent variables are
represented by ellipses; observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
Perception of risk was negatively associated with performance
on probabilistic reasoning tasks. Furthermore, conjunction
fallacy predicted behavior change via risk perception (mediated).
Indeed, conjunction fallacy had a negative impact on risk. The
finding that poorer appreciation of probabilistic information
predicted higher perception of risk is consistent with earlier work
that demonstrated inaccurate perception of risk arises from a
weak understanding of event likelihood (Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic,
2016). In addition, Koblentz (2011) reported that proneness to
conjunction error negatively influenced the ability to estimate
accurately terrorism-related risk.
In turn, the results of this study indicate that a lower
propensity to make conjunction errors has a positive impact
on risk perception, with risk perception predicting a greater
likelihood of behavior change. These results support the notion
that probabilistic bias (particularly conjunction error) has the
potential to lead to a misperception of risk, which is likely to
produce ineffective or even detrimental behavior adaptation in
response to terrorism-related threat (Blalock et al., 2009). With
regard to risk perception and specific forms of probabilistic
reasoning bias, it is important to acknowledge that multiple
heuristics may operate within situations. Hence, the current
finding regarding conjunction could reflect the perception of
risk used (Peters et al., 2006). Indeed, preceding research reports
that task framing influences the likelihood of conjunction error
(Nilsson et al., 2013). In terms of risk, conjunction may occur
via the availability heuristic, whereby threat assessments are
associated with recent negative experiences or events producing
the risk (Peters et al., 2006). In the case of conjunction,
this may involve referencing risk to specific threats and
consequences. Considering conjunction fallacy more generally,
it is conceptually unclear which heuristics facilitate conjunction
error. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1983), in their
important formative article, contended the representativeness
heuristic caused conjunction error. However, a body of papers
since have demonstrated that the representativeness heuristic
is far from a necessity for the conjunction error to occur
(Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Nilsson, 2008; Nilsson
et al., 2013). The finding from this study that risk perception
had a moderate positive effect on terrorism-related behavior
change is consistent with previous work (Goodwin et al.,
2005), supporting the notion that an increased sense of threat
has a key role concerning terrorism-related behavior change
likelihood.
With regard to risk scores, DOSPERT indicated moderate
levels of engagement with risky behaviors. This was not
surprising because the measure samples common behaviors
across several key life domains (ethical, financial, health/safety,
social and recreational risks). Collectively, the DOSPERT
provides a broad overview of risk, however, the degree to
which risk influences terrorism-related behavior change may
vary as a function of domain and risk type. Indeed, ethical,
health/safety, financial, and recreational risk factors correlated
positively with increased terrorism-related behavior change. The
strongest relationships existed for health/safety, recreational, and
ethical. The findings for health/safety and recreational make
sense given that key aspects of terrorism-related behavior change
relate to lifestyle choices (Torabi and Seo, 2004). The finding for
ethical is less clear-cut, but it is possible that this outcome pertains
to a greater awareness of order, rules, and increased vigilance,
which Stevens et al. (2012) found was a commonly reported
behavioral response to a perceived terrorist threat.
Reported levels of terrorism-related behavior change were
small and attributable mainly to items connected to travel habits
(using public transportation, flying on commercial airplanes)
and personal preferences (avoidance of cities, voting behavior).
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This aligned with preceding work identifying terrorism-
related behavior adaptions in attendant areas of everyday
life (e.g., lifestyle choices, Torabi and Seo, 2004; mode of
transportation, Blalock et al., 2009; travel intentions, Reisinger
and Mavondo, 2005; and selection of tourist destinations, Sönmez
and Graefe, 1998).
Broader Theoretical Context
Dual-process theories of cognition (Sloman, 1996; Chaiken and
Trope, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) provide a useful
conceptual framework for interpreting and contextualizing the
current findings. However, the range, complexity and diversity
of dual-processing theories limits the formation of precise
conclusions (Evans, 2008). Hence, extrapolations within the
present paper appeal to the dual-processing approach generally,
rather than specific models and processes.
In this context, the dual-processing approach proposes that
judgment outcomes arise from two distinct, but interrelated
systems (cognitive evaluations vs. emotions) (Loewenstein
et al., 2001). Cognitive evaluations utilize effortful, intentional,
attention demanding processes and base decisions on analytical
appraisal of information. Thus, cognitive evaluations use
established rules of logic and consider empirical evidence (Slovic
et al., 2004). Contrastingly, emotions derive from affect and
use general cognitive heuristics. A related dual-process theory is
Cognitive–Experiential Self-Theory (CEST, Epstein, 1994). A key
feature of CEST is its focus on ‘thinking or cognitive style.’
Specifically, CEST differentiates between rational (controlled)
and experiential (automatic) processing. The rational system is
slow, effortful and demanding of attention, whilst the intuitive
system is automatic, fast and non-conscious (Epstein, 2003). Each
thinking style directs information processing (Kozhevnikov,
2007).
From a dual-processing perspective, this study indicated
that different processes might influence perception of risk and
terrorism-related behavior change. This is a useful conceptual
distinction for future work to elaborate and assess. Particularly,
the notion that perception of risk arose from effortful cognitive
evaluations (risk as analyses), whilst terrorism-related behavior
change derived from subjective-personalized thinking (risk as
feelings) (Loewenstein et al., 2001). These suppositions are
congruent with the CEST model. Particularly, the view that
terrorism-related behavior change develops more from feeling,
emotion and intuition and less from analytic cognition (Epstein,
1994).
Indeed, acts of terrorism by their inherent nature are typically
dramatic and violent in content and evoke emotional reactions
likely to facilitate experiential processing. Resultant responses
should then bias people away from consideration of the actual or
more objectively defined risk. This may occur because emotions
provide a rapid, efficient basis for directing behavior in complex,
uncertain real-world situations (Zajonc, 1980; Slovic and Peters,
2006). From this viewpoint, emphasis on deriving judgments
based on intuition and emotion reduces the relative importance
of empirical fact-based information (see below).
Similarly, the finding that combining risk perception with
probabilistic reasoning enhanced the predictive power of the
cognitive-analytic route is consistent with dual-process theory
(e.g., CEST) to the extent that appraisal-based processes (such as
perception of risk) are viewed to mediate the relationship between
effortful cognitive evaluation and behavioral outcomes (in this
context terrorism-related behavior change) (Epstein et al., 1996).
Limitations and Future Considerations
An important limitation within the present study was that
measures were self-report and assessed only subjective
evaluations of behavior change, risk and thinking style. In
this context, it is unclear whether responses actually reflected
real world intentions and behaviors. This problem is not unique
to this particular piece of research, but reflects the fact that
self-report measures provide only snapshots of processes and
thoughts. In the case of risk perception, the relationship between
threat and behavior is uncertain. People engage in many risky
behaviors and correspondingly avoid many low risk activities.
Similarly, there is variance between intentions to change
behavior, actual behavior adaptation and adherence to change. In
the context of reality testing, the IPO-RT assessed only subjective
evaluation of perceived likelihood of reality testing errors.
Due to the extemporaneous nature of reality testing decisions,
individuals may lack conscious awareness, or insight into their
veracity. This is likely to affect self-report measure accuracy.
This is true of metacognitive measures generally. Accordingly,
the relationship between subjective performance and actual
performance is often weak.
As noted above, emotional reactions often bias thinking
away from a cognitive-analytic style (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996).
Particularly, emotions influence perception (e.g., Slovic et al.,
2002; Lerner et al., 2003; Hogarth et al., 2011). The current model
did not directly assess emotional reactions as either predictors
or dependent responses to risk and terror situations. Hence,
it is impossible within the present study to make conclusions
regarding the role of emotions. Accordingly, subsequent research
should investigate further how emotional reactions influence risk
perception and terrorism-related behavior change.
The link between terrorism-related behavior change and a
preference for subjective-intuitive thinking, as conceptualized
within dual-process models, requires further examination. This is
because the present study failed to measure directly the types of
processing specified by dual-process models. Rather, the current
investigation made use of measures that act as ‘proxies’ for these
styles of thinking. Effectively, there is no direct evidence that the
two factors measured here represent distinct processing modes.
Nevertheless, the dual-process approach (i.e., CEST) provides a
framework in which to assess the current findings, evaluate study
limitations and specify the remit of subsequent research. From
this perspective, future work on perception of risk and terrorism-
related behavior change could align itself more closely with
CEST and its measurement instruments (such as the Rational-
Experiential Inventory, or the Rational/Experiential Multimodal
Inventory). In addition to assessing individual differences,
experimental analyses could be of value in determining the
characteristics of different modes of thinking and the extent to
which they underpin terrorism-related judgments of risk. For
example, if judgments derive from intuitive modes of thinking,
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then these should be insensitive to manipulations that load
working memory or attentional processes. Clearly, the current
work, although setting the foundations for considering terrorism-
related judgments of risk within a dual-process framework, needs
to be more explicit in aligning and evaluating this contention.
Concern for personal well-being and avoidance of physical
danger affects terrorism-related perception of risk and behavior
change. This study considered only behavior adaption.
Consequently, future research may wish to examine which
specific terrorism-related risk perceptions best predict behavior
change. Potential variables are risk attached to personal safety,
especially injury or death. At a practical level, it is important to
know which risk perceptions and behaviors are malleable and
which are resistant to modification. From a counter-terrorism
perspective, this information would help to advise strategy.
Particularly, services and government policy could identify
and target important, undervalued factors. This would help to
facilitate and guide effective terrorism-related behavior change.
In the present study, the use of the term ‘previous terrorist
attacks’ was rather vague and non-specific. Future work could
improve event salience by referring to specific or more detailed
events. Within these, systematic manipulation of factors, such
as proximity, extent and outcome of attack would enable
researchers to identify motivating features of behavior change.
A further variable to consider is immediacy. Following high
profile, terrorist attacks intention and motivation to change
behavior are likely to be high. Charting intention to change
and adherence to modification over time would also prove
informative. Assessing important variables related to change
(particularly extent, adherence and period of time during which
adaptation is likely) could prove highly instructive.
Data in the present study was cross-sectional. Collecting data
at one point in time is problematic because it is not possible
to establish causal links within models. However, it is still
permissible to make predictive inferences when specification of
tested models is a priori and SEM is used (Hubbard and Mannell,
2001). In these circumstances, good data fit provides evidence
for model legitimacy, facilitating inferences about relationships
(Bollen, 1989). This article met these criteria.
This work has important real world applications. Particularly,
it suggests that perception of risk-related events (i.e., media
portrayals) links to behavior change. This notion is consistent
with earlier work on social amplification of risk, which proposes
an interaction between risk events and social processes (see
Kasperson et al., 1988). In this context, risk per se does not
exist and distinctions between true (absolute) and distorted
(socially determined) are redundant. Instead, characteristics
of public response arising from institutional information and
social amplification determine perceptions of risk (Kasperson
et al., 1988). In part, this explains why people possess distorted
perceptions of terrorism-related threat. An extreme example of
this is terrorism focused moral panics. As Rothe and Muzzatti
(2004) report, media and political depictions of terrorists and
terrorism have contributed to excessive levels of panic and fear,
misguided public consciousness, and the development of social
detrimental legislation. The low levels of observed terrorism-
related behavior change within this paper do not diminish the
importance of the findings because minor changes in public
behavior can produce direct and indirect (ripple) effects, which
have major societal consequences (Kasperson et al., 1988; Everard
et al., 2016). For instance, increased driving following the 9/11
attacks resulted in increased road traffic fatalities (Blalock et al.,
2009). Future research should examine this further.
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